The blockchain, plums, and lemons: Information asymmetries & transparency in decentralized markets by Notheisen, Benedikt & Weinhardt, Christof
The blockchain, plums, and 
lemons: Information asymme-
tries & transparency in decen-
tralized markets
by Benedikt Notheisen and Christof Weinhardt
No. 130  |  FEBRUARY 2019
WORKING PAPER SERIES IN ECONOMICS
KIT – Die Forschungsuniversität in der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft econpapers.wiwi.kit.edu
Impressum
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
Kaiserstraße 12
76131 Karlsruhe
KIT – Die Forschungsuniversität in der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft 
Working Paper Series in Economics
No. 130, February 2019
ISSN  2190-9806
econpapers.wiwi.kit.edu
The Blockchain, Plums, and Lemons
Information Asymmetries & Transparency in Decentralized Markets∗
Benedikt Notheisen† and Christof Weinhardt‡
January 30, 2019
Abstract
Despite a growing interest, researchers and practitioners still struggle to transfer the
blockchain concept introduced by Bitcoin to market-oriented application scenarios. To
shed light on the technology’s usage in markets with asymmetric information, this study
analyzes the effect of the blockchain’s public transparency paradigm on behavioral
patterns and market outcomes. In line with prior research, our findings indicate that
the blockchain’s shared record mitigates adverse selection effects and reduces moral
hazard of good market participants (plums). In addition, we identify an incentive for
bad market participants (lemons) to behave opportunistically in the presence of perfect
quality information. More specifically, the disclosed information allows them to learn
about quality differences between plums and lemons, deceive their counterparties, and
move to a new equilibrium with increased utility. As a result, the market collapses
despite a welfare gain and future generations are denied market access. In addition,
plums and lemons are committed to inefficient equilibria following irrational behavior.
In total, this study aims to provide initial guidance for blockchain adoption in the
context of markets with information asymmetries and highlights risks that arise from
competition, the exposure to irrational behavior, and the implementation of services
on the infrastructure level.
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1. Introduction
Despite their growing interest1, researchers and practitioners still struggle to transfer
the blockchain concept to the broader context of market-oriented applications. While few
success stories, such as Bitcoin2, pioneer financial markets, many initiatives fail to leverage
the technology’s potential efficiently. One major reason for this stuttering development is the
limited knowledge about the economic implications of the underlying technological concepts
and their relationship with the socio-economic environment, market mechanisms, and player
rationales. In consequence, we aim to shed light on the technology’s capability to function in
market environments with information asymmetries, quality differences, and opportunistic
behavior. To do so, we examine how a core feature of blockchain-based information systems
- the current, complete, and publicly available record of historic transactions Notheisen,
Cholewa, and Shanmugam (2017) - affects the behavioral patterns of market participants
and the resulting impact on market outcomes.
From a technical perspective, the public record of past transactions enables the members
of the blockchain network to validate the correctness of database updates within the consen-
sus process. By auditing the past, they can evaluate the correctness of transactional data
and determine whether the interacting parties possess rightful ownership of a transacted
object. To facilitate overall data integrity, every member can participate in this process
and has access to the historic record. In market environments with asymmetric informa-
tion and quality differences, this new form of transparency does not only reduce uncertainty
within interactions but also enables individual members to exploit the publicly disclosed
information about peers and business partners to maximize their own gains. In this study,
we determine under which circumstances such behavior occurs and how it affects a market
in total. Thereby, we aim to identify factors blockchain adopters should consider before
applying blockchain technology in market-oriented contexts and use cases.
To examine behavioral changes that come with a different information system configu-
ration, we utilize a two-period lending game with incomplete information and entrepreneurs
that choose effort levels (moral hazard) and differ in their disutility of effort (adverse selec-
tion). Our model comprises a loan market with a competitive banking sector that shares
1Notheisen, Hawlitschek, and Weinhardt (2017) document a rapid growth of publications in the fields of
information systems, finance and economics, computer science, and law since 2014. In addition, (Lannquist,
2018) and CB Insights (2017) highlight the increasing investments of firms, and Friedlmaier, Tumasjan, and
Welpe (2018) and Holotiuk, Pisani, and Moormann (2018) the growing technology market.
2Another example is the Australian Stock Exchange’s effort to replace the current post-trade system with
a blockchain-based alternative. After several testing phases and stakeholder consultations, the Australian
Stock Exchange (ASX) announced in a recent media release that the current post-trade system ”CHESS”
will be replaced with a blockchain-based alternative that will take over core functions of clearing and settling
equity transactions.
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the market equally and a continuum of entrepreneurs, which is uniformly distributed on the
interval [0, 1]. Entrepreneurs live for two periods, can be either good (a plum) or bad (a
lemon), have access to a one-period project in each period, and apply for loans at a bank to
fund these projects. At the end of period 1, the banks learn about the project outcomes of
entrepreneurs and share this information via an information system. Eventually, dependent
on the informativeness and access scope of the information system, banks and entrepreneurs
can use this information to asses entrepreneurial quality.
In line with prior research, our findings indicate that sharing information about en-
trepreneurial performance mitigates the impact of adverse selection on the banking side and
reduces moral hazard of plums by generating a disciplinary effect. In this study, we further-
more identify an incentive for lemons to behave opportunistically in the presence of value-
adding information brokers. They can improve utility by using the information from the
blockchain’s public record to learn about the quality of plums and mimic them accordingly.
Moreover, their opportunistic behavior is more pronounced for greater price improvements,
lower quality differences, and lower quality in general. In opaque markets (i.e. markets
without the analytic service of an information broker), neither plums nor lemons behave op-
portunistically. Irrespective of the information regime, plums and lemons are both locked-in
to behavioral changes, and thus committed to inefficient equilibria in subsequent periods.
While rational agents are not affected by this effect, the consequences of irrational deci-
sions spill over to future periods. From a market perspective, mimicking lemons create a
welfare gain under perfect information. However, their opportunistic behavior also violates
the break-even condition of the banking sector, leads to a market collapse, and denies future
generations’ access to credit. In total, this indicates that using blockchain-based information
systems in highly competitive and transparent markets with irrational agents should be con-
sidered carefully. The same holds for implementing smart contract-based analytic otherwise
information-generating services on the infrastructure level.
In consequence, the contribution of this study is threefold: First, we extend the growing
body of research on the economics of blockchain by analyzing the effects of the blockchain’s
public transparency paradigm in market environments with asymmetric information. Sec-
ond, we contribute to the field of banking research by examining impact of publicly shared
quality information on credit markets. And third, we add to the literature on blockchain
adoption by highlighting the risks of blockchain-based transparency.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 illustrates the role of
transparency in the blockchain concept, reviews related literature on information sharing
arrangements to extract potential blockchain implications, and highlights our research gap.
Section 3 specifies the model and outlines our solution concept. Section 4 establishes behav-
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ioral patterns on the supply and demand side of the market and evaluates the potentials and
effects of opportunistic behavior. In addition, section 5 discusses these findings by relax-
ing central model assumptions. Eventually, section 6 concludes the paper, by summarizing
our findings, highlighting the implications for blockchain adoption, and illustrating future
research opportunities.
2. Related Literature
This paper relates to previous research about blockchain design and examines the eco-
nomic implications of the public disclosure of information essential for the technology’s func-
tioning. In this aspect, our findings relate to the growing body of research on the economics
of blockchain. From a broader perspective, the transparency that comes with blockchain
adoption also resembles features of information sharing arrangements present in modern fi-
nancial markets. To take these commonalities into account, we embed our analyses within
the context of information sharing arrangements in credit markets - a well-studied example
of markets with asymmetric information - and extract blockchain-relevant implications from
this body of research. In consequence, this section introduces the technological and economic
aspects of transparency in the blockchain concept, briefly illustrates how credit information
is currently shared, reviews the most important theoretical and empirical findings about
information sharing arrangements, summarizes the resulting research gap, and formulates
three research questions. A detailed overview over the characteristics of information sharing
arrangements and the related literature is available in appendix C.
2.1. The Role of Transparency in the Blockchain Concept
From a technical perspective, most blockchain systems comprise three core building
blocks: A distributed database, cryptographic algorithms, and a consensus mechanism
(Notheisen et al., 2017). The distributed database consists of cryptographically intercon-
nected blocks that aggregate and store transactional data and provide a copy of the ledger
to every user of the system. This distributed character of the blockchain’s ledger dissem-
inates information equally to all members of the network thereby creating a new form of
transparency (Catalini and Gans, 2016). Asymmetric encryption enables users to interact
with the database, allows them to specify and authorize transactions via public and private
keys, and ensures the unambiguous assignment of past transactions based on their unique
address in the system (public key). The decentralized consensus mechanism empowers users
to consensually verify and append new transactions by securely voting on their correctness
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based on the historical data stored in the distributed database. More specifically, within the
consensus process each participating user verifies each transaction’s formal correctness by
checking whether it was signed by the right entities and auditing whether the sender actually
owns what he or she transacts via the historical record. In the context of Bitcoin for in-
stance, the transparency over past transactions ensures that the sender of a new transaction
owns a sufficient amount of Bitcoin to cover the sending amount (Nakamoto, 2008). In more
complex interactions that comprise a two-legged transaction process the review is not limited
to solvency of each counterparty but may include the transacted assets attributes as well
(Notheisen et al., 2017). In the case of physical assets, transaction management furthermore
requires overcoming the trust frontier between the physical and digital world via a trusted
interface to prevent the incorporation of corrupted information (Hawlitschek, Notheisen, and
Teubner, 2018; Glaser, 2017).
To conduct a blockchain transaction, a user denominates a transactional object (e.g. a
specific amount of a money or an asset), specifies a recipient (via his or her public key),
references past transactions to proof ownership, signs the transaction (with his or her own
private key), and broadcasts it to the peer-to-peer network. Across the network, other users
collect, verify, and aggregate broadcasted transactions and propose the resulting data blocks
as database updates to their peers (Eyal and Sirer, 2014)3. Whenever such a verified update
is proposed, each participant of the consensus process checks its validity as described above
before casting a vote. If a majority of the users agrees with the proposed update, the proposer
appends his or her block to the blockchain, broadcasts the update to the network, and earns
a reward (Nakamoto, 2008).
Building on the paradigm of public transparency, these building blocks and their func-
tioning ensure the integrity, consistency, and correctness of data within a blockchain system
and enable users to interact in the absence of a governing central authority. In markets
with asymmetric information, however, transparency has implications that go beyond pure
technological functionality and can lead to hidden information in the pre-contractual, and
hidden action problems in the post-contractual stage (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981;
Hellmann and Stiglitz, 2000). In consequence, we have to take transparency implications
into account, if we aim to use blockchain technology in such environments.
On one hand, the increased transparency about asset portfolios helps traders to identify
3In many blockchain systems a fraction of specialized users - often called miners - focuses on the update
process, while others only send and receive transactions. For the sake of simplicity, we limit our analyses to
a network of homogeneous nodes that all participate in the consensus process. Introducing different roles
in the network would require the examination of user’s incentives to fulfill those roles. This could be part
of future research efforts as this study only aims to provide a first intuition of user rationales and welfare
effects in market environments with asymmetric information.
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suitable counterparties thereby increasing liquidity and welfare (Malinova and Park, 2017).
In repeated interactions blockchain-based transparency about past behavior furthermore
facilitates the stability of reputation effects by ensuring that historical records (e.g. in form
of reviews and ratings) correctly reflect actual interactions and improves the auditability of
the resulting digital activity trails (Catalini and Gans, 2016). From a governance perspective,
blockchain technology furthermore increases transparency over ownership, and thus alleviates
opportunistic behavior of individual stakeholders (Yermack, 2017).
On the other hand, the revelation of previously private information about assets’ at-
tributes and the characteristics and behavior of interacting parties may change market
dynamics and induce adverse behavior of individual users. These changes affect market
equilibria, the profits and utility of individual market participants, and eventually welfare
(Bloomfield and O’Hara, 1999). As a result, it is crucial to consider technology-specific trans-
parency effects in the decision whether and how to use blockchain technology in environments
plagued by information asymmetries. More specifically, this includes understanding how the
new transparency paradigm that comes with blockchain adoption affects economic interac-
tions, market outcomes, and the welfare of an economy.
2.2. Lessons from Information Sharing Arrangements in Credit Markets
The information sharing arrangements used in today’s credit markets allow a first glimpse
on these transparency effects and their impact. In credit markets asymmetric information
and the resulting uncertainty about quality lead to inefficient allocations of capital that can
cause profit reductions, welfare losses, and market failures (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Hell-
mann and Stiglitz, 2000). For small and medium enterprises for instance, empirical evidence
indicates that credit rationing is more severe for more opaque firms at the beginning of their
banking relationship (Kirschenmann, 2016; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004) This effect is
furthermore driven by adverse selection issues and is inversely related to firm age (Hyytinen
and Väänänen, 2006). For consumer credit on the other side, Karlan and Zinman (2009) find
strong evidence for moral hazard and weaker evidence for hidden information issues, while
informational barriers to lender competition persist (Calem, Gordy, and Mester, 2006). To
mitigate the resulting issues various institutions, such as collateral (Bester, 1987), complete
contingency contracts (Sharpe, 1990), or reputation systems (Diamond, 1989) developed
over time. Besides these approaches, the sharing of previously private relationship informa-
tion also helps to dismantle information asymmetries and alleviate the issues outlined above
(Millon and Thakor, 1985). In a similar fashion, the blockchain’s distributed and complete
record facilitates the sharing of information - irrespective of its actually intended use.
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In practice, information sharing arrangements institutionalize the provision, scope, and
disclosure of information about lenders to banks and other stakeholders (Jappelli and Pagano,
2002; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007; World Bank, 2011, 2013). Public credit registries
are centralized databases established, owned, and managed by public entities to support
their supervisory duties. As such, they provide universal coverage of loans above a speci-
fied threshold, impose participation by law, and disseminate consolidated information about
an entrepreneur’s riskiness to current and potential lenders and regulators. Private credit
bureaus on the other hand are privately owned organizations that add significant value to
credit information (Kallberg and Udell, 2003) and thereby cater to the needs of commercial
lenders in their assessment of entrepreneurial risk. Participation is voluntary and based on a
reciprocal agreement that offers incomplete but detailed information about loans, repayment
histories, and personal backgrounds. In theory, public credit registries are set up to compen-
sate for the lack of private arrangements (Padilla and Pagano, 2000; Jappelli and Pagano,
2002). However, in some countries both systems coexist and cater to different segments of
the market (World Bank, 2013).
Theoretical predictions. Economic theory predicts that while sharing information helps
to dissolve adverse selection problems and to prevent moral hazard, strategic rationales on
both sides of the market are crucial factors that determine the actual effect induced by
the increase in transparency. In their seminal study, Pagano and Jappelli (1993) investigate
individual banks’ motivation to share information and identify borrower mobility and hetero-
geneity, market size, and advances in information technology as positive incentives to share
information. The fear of competition on the other hand impedes information sharing. In
total, their model indicates that it is an efficient means to mitigate adverse selection. Padilla
and Pagano (1997) build on Pagano and Jappelli (1993) and find that information sharing
lowers future profits by homogenizing information among banks, while raising the chances
for success today. Eventually, the resulting trade-off between increasing competition on the
future and higher rents today determines the banks’ willingness to share information. Bouck-
aert and Degryse (2006) emphasize the strategic dimension of information sharing and show
that incumbent lenders limit information sharing to project outcomes in order to discourage
potential entrants. Consistent with this rationale, Gehrig and Stenbacka (2007) suggest that
information sharing reduces informational monopoly rents earned from relationship infor-
mation but also highlight that it makes poaching more profitable (Bennardo, Pagano, and
Piccolo, 2015). However, Karapetyan and Stacescu (2014) also emphasize that this loss of in-
formational rents induces lenders to increase their investment in the acquisition of additional
information in order to regain their monopoly. From a market perspective, Bennardo et al.
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(2015) predict that sharing information improves coordination among lenders and thereby
decreases entrepreneurs incentive to overborrow when lending from multiple banks. As a
result, interest and default rates decrease and the access to credit improves. In the case of
distress however, intensified lender coordination increases default probabilities even further
(Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini, 2011).
In contrast to these studies, Padilla and Pagano (2000) focus on the entrepreneurial
effects of information sharing. While sharing information about entrepreneurs raises their
incentive to perform, it also creates a disciplinary effect as hazardous behavior impedes the
ability to obtain credit from other sources as well. However, Padilla and Pagano (2000)
also find that sharing too much information can eliminate any disciplinary effects, because
entrepreneurs’ true types are revealed. In consequence, lenders need to tailor the type
and accuracy of information to balance the trade-off between adverse selection and moral
hazard effects in order to incentive entrepreneurs to perform on their optimal level. Diamond
(1989) and Vercammen (1995) examine on specific aspects of such disciplinary effects in
greater detail: Diamond (1989) studies the formation and evolution of reputation effects
and indicates that reputation needs time to establish. In contrast, Vercammen (1995) - who
assesses the impact of credit bureau policy on entrepreneurial efforts - finds that the resulting
improvement of welfare does not hold over time, because lenders become increasingly aware of
entrepreneurial types as credit histories lengthen. A similar effect emerges with the increasing
informativeness of consumer credit reports. More specifically, Sharma (2017) illustrates that
the probability of strategic defaults is higher when the information content of credit reports
is more likely to reveal entrepreneurial types.
Empirical evidence. Empirical studies aim to provide complementary evidence for these
theoretical predictions and evaluate the economic impact of information sharing arrange-
ments in a broader context. Brown and Zehnder (2010) for instance transfer the model of
Pagano and Jappelli (1993) to an experimental setup and confirm their findings as more
asymmetric information facilitates information sharing, while stronger competition has an
impeding effect. In addition, Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2013) utilize contract-level data
from the US to study the effects predicted by Padilla and Pagano (1997) and Padilla and
Pagano (2000) and find - consistent with theory - that the entry into a credit bureau reduces
contract delinquencies and defaults. Similarly, Jappelli and Pagano (2002) demonstrate that
lending volume is higher and credit risk lower in countries where lenders share information.
From an individual’s perspective, the existence of an efficient information sharing arrange-
ment reduces firms’ financing obstacles significantly (Beck, Demirg-Kunt, and Maksimovic,
2004) as credit bureaus add significant explanatory power to failure prediction models (Kall-
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berg and Udell, 2003). Dierkes, Erner, Langer, and Norden (2013) confirm this effect channel
and indicate that a prediction’s accuracy increases with firm age, credit bureau experience,
and the spatial distance between firm and credit bureau and decreases with firm size. With
respect to private credit, Djankov et al. (2007) find that private credit bureaus are more
likely in richer and public credit registries are more likely in poorer countries. Moreover, the
introduction of an information sharing arrangement increases the volume of private credit
in both. In total, these results support previous findings (e.g. Jappelli and Pagano (2002),
Pagano and Jappelli (1993), or Padilla and Pagano (1997)) and highlight the beneficial role
of information sharing in developing countries with poor creditor rights. However, Bos,
Breza, and Liberman (2018) also identify a causal effect of negative credit information on
employment and wage levels.
Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2009) find similar effects for corporate loans and provide
empirical evidence that information sharing improves the access to and lowers the cost of
credit - especially for opaque ventures. However, Behr and Sonnekalb (2012) are not able to
confirm these results for public credit registries but find a positive effect on loan performance.
This effect is more pronounced for repeated interactions and areas with low competition,
which supports the disciplinary effect predicted by Padilla and Pagano (2000) A similar
ambiguity prevails for the volume effects identified in theoretical and empirical research
(e.g. Padilla and Pagano (2000), Djankov et al. (2007), or Allen and Santomero (1997)).
Grajzl and Laptieva (2016) find no evidence for a volume effect with respect to public credit
registries whereas, private credit bureaus on the other hand are associated with an increase
in lending volume. Furthermore, extending the provision of credit information to borrowers
creates an awareness about financing costs and reduces credit volume and overborrowing
issues (Bertrand and Morse, 2011).
In addition, there are several studies that examine the effects of information sharing
arrangements from a banking perspective. Barth, Lin, Lin, and Song (2009) for instance,
provide strong evidence that private credit bureaus reduce lending corruption and enhance
the curtailing effect of bank competition on lending corruption. Moreover, Houston, Lin, Lin,
and Ma (2010) support Hertzberg et al. (2011)’s coordination hypothesis and indicate that
information sharing decreases banks’ risk-taking. This leads to positive effects on bank prof-
itability, bank risk, the likelihood of financial crises, and economic growth. Buyukkarabacak
and Valev (2012) furthermore confirm the positive effect on banking crises for both, pub-
lic and private information sharing arrangements. On the other hand, Giannetti, Liberti,
and Sturgess (2017) underline the strategic rationales illustrated by Bouckaert and Degryse
(2006) and show that banks manipulate shared credit information to protect profitable cus-
tomer segments.
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Blockchain implications. In total, the reviewed literature on information sharing ar-
rangements offers several valuable insights with respect to blockchain technology: First, it
helps us to understand the capability of the blockchain’s record to share information. The
studies of Kallberg and Udell (2003) and Dierkes et al. (2013) for instance indicate that
sharing information via the blockchain’s distributed and complete record of past transac-
tions provides an efficient tool to mitigate problems caused by pre- and post-contractual
information asymmetries (Padilla and Pagano, 2000; Beck et al., 2004) and facilitate coor-
dination among users (Bennardo et al., 2015; Hertzberg et al., 2011; Bertrand and Morse,
2011; Brown and Zehnder, 2010). However, to ensure a positive impact, it is important to
fine-tune the (time) scale (Diamond, 1989; Vercammen, 1995) and (content) scope (Padilla
and Pagano, 2000; Bouckaert and Degryse, 2006) of disclosed information carefully. A spe-
cial challenge for instance poses the impossibility to delete past transactions, because the
disciplinary effects fade with lengthening records Vercammen (1995). On the other hand,
the blockchain’s immutable and tamper-free nature prevents and thereby reduces the effects
of data manipulation (Giannetti et al., 2017) - at least in the digital world (Hawlitschek
et al., 2018). Second, it outlines potential channels through which a change in transparency
characteristics might influence behavioral patterns and market outcomes. More specifically,
using a consensually updated and shared database tightens competition (Pagano and Jap-
pelli, 1993), dilutes informational monopolies (Padilla and Pagano, 1997, 2000; Bouckaert
and Degryse, 2006), and improves market access, volume, and efficiency (Djankov et al.,
2007; Brown et al., 2009). In addition, sharing previously private information on the sup-
ply side redistributes rents to the demand side (Padilla and Pagano, 1997) and creates a
disciplinary effect that alleviates opportunistic behavior (Padilla and Pagano, 2000). The
trade-off between those effects determines the impact on welfare, the motivation to share
information, and strategic rationales on both sides of the market (Bouckaert and Degryse,
2006; Sharma, 2017).
2.3. Research Gap and Research Questions
Despite these commonalities, there is also a crucial difference between the information
system traditional information sharing arrangements are built on and blockchain-based infor-
mation systems: Traditional arrangements built on centralized information systems provide
a specific scope of information to a selected group of users. In consequence, banks have
access to information about the complete market, while entrepreneurs can only access in-
formation about themselves. The blockchain concept on the other hand does not curtail
the access rights of individual users and discloses the stored information publicly. This way,
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blockchain-based systems ensure data integrity and facilitate the validity of database up-
dates in the absence of a central authority. As a result, all users have the same level of
information.
Thus, to fully leverage the blockchain’s potential, it is crucial to understand potential side
effects that come with the shift to public transparency. More specifically, in markets with
asymmetric information and quality differences increasing transparency does not only reduce
uncertainty but also enables opportunistic users to exploit quality information in order to
maximize their individual gains. To shed light on the underlying behavioral patterns and
outcomes and to identify potential risks of blockchain adoption, we formulate the following
research questions:
Research question 1. How does the public availability of quality information affect the
behavior of individual participants on the demand side of the market?
Within the related analyses, we investigate who changes behavior, how and why these
changes occur, and evaluate the resulting outcomes. To do so, we take the perspective of
both plums and lemons and examine the incentives to change behavior, the consequences
that come with changes and dismantle effect channels over time. In addition, we consider
different system configurations and connect individual outcomes to characteristics of the
socio-economic environment. However, the effect of behavioral changes is not limited to
individuals but also spills over to the market and the economy as a whole.
Research question 2. How do behavioral changes of individual market participants on the
demand side affect the economy and the market’s functioning as a whole?
This research question covers welfare effects as well as the impact on the supply (banking)
side of the market. In consequence, we examine whether the aggregated behavioral changes
of individual market participants improve or impede welfare and which factors drive these
effects. To analyze the markets functioning, we furthermore take a closer look at the impact
of behavioral changes on the supply side (i.e. banks) of the market. Eventually, it is also
important to transfer the findings from research questions 1 and 2 to a practical application
context to support researchers and practitioners in their blockchain endeavors.
Research question 3. What aspects do we need to consider when using blockchain technol-
ogy in market-oriented application contexts exposed to information asymmetries?
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3. The Model
Economy. There is a loan market with a competitive banking sector with b > 1 immortal
banks and a continuum of entrepreneurs, which are uniformly distributed on the interval
[0, 1]. Entrepreneurs live for two periods, are either plums (good) or lemons (bad), have
access to one-period investment projects in each period, and apply for loans at the banks to
fund these projects. They furthermore can choose a bank at the beginning of each period
at zero costs. When new entrepreneurs come to a bank, the bank has no knowledge about
their type. However, banks can gather information about entrepreneurial characteristics
through their lending relationship (Boot and Thakor, 2000; Boot, 2000), as they observe
project outcomes at the end of each period. In addition, banks share the observed default
information via an information system at the end of period 1. This way they aim to reduce the
information asymmetries they face when entrepreneurs switch banks and use the information
acquired from the information system to approximate types (Padilla and Pagano, 2000). All
actors are risk-neutral and act as rational economic agents. Figure 1 illustrates the sequence







levels for period 1.











levels for period 2.









Period 1 Period 2
Fig. 1. Timeline of actions
Information system. The information system functions as a means to periodically share
information, stores default information over time, and makes it available to its users. This
way it enables banks to assess entrepreneurs based on historic averages of past generations.
However, the accuracy of this assessment depends on the informativeness of the conveyed
data. To represent this dependency in our model we define two information regimes: Imper-
fect and perfect information. In the imperfect information regime, the information system
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supplies plain default information. Under perfect information on the other hand, an infor-
mation broker - for instance in form of a private credit bureau or a rating agency - adds
value in form of type information to the default data. As a result of this analytic assessment,
banks can identify entrepreneurial types by comparing actual period 1 efforts with historic
averages. In addition, the system can either be deployed as a traditional data base or as
a blockchain-based information system. In the first case, banks have full access, while en-
trepreneurs can only see their own performance record. In the blockchain case on the other
hand, all users have access to all data.
Entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs have no initial funds and access to a one-period investment
project in each period. This project requires an initial investment of 1 at the beginning of a
period and yields a positive return R > 1 at the end of a period, if successful. In the case of
failure, it yields a return of 0 and the entrepreneur defaults. A project’s probability of success
p
i
∈ [0, 1] depends on the entrepreneur’s type i ∈ {H,L}, is monotonic in the effort exercised
by an entrepreneur4, and creates a quadratic disutility of effort Vi(p(i)) = aip
2





> 0. The disutility of effort is a strictly convex function with V ′ ∈ [0,∞)
and V ′′ > 0 and represents the costs an entrepreneur has to bear to achieve a specific success
probability pi. Intuitively, this reflects the idea that plums posses greater entrepreneurial
skills compared to lemons. As a result, effort is always cheaper for plums but never costless




> 0 allows them to




at a given cost V̄ = VH(pH ) = VL(pL) or
some success probability p̄ ∈ (0, 1] at lower costs VH(p̄) < VL(p̄). In addition, the marginal
costs of effort are higher for bad than for good entrepreneurs V ′L(p̄) > V
′
H(p̄). For p = 0, the
disutility of effort is equal to zero for both types (VL(0) = VH(0) = 0).
In total, entrepreneurs experience utility from successful projects and choose their indi-
vidual levels of effort p
i
to maximize their expected utility over both periods, while taking
the effort choices of other entrepreneurs as given. They furthermore act as price takers and
take the interest rates offered by the banks as given. Eventually, an individual entrepreneur’s
utility is equal to:
Ui(pi,1 , pi,2) = pi,1(R−R1)− Vi(pi,1)︸ ︷︷ ︸






− Vi(pi,2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected net return period 2
, with i ∈ {H,L}.
(1)
In period 1, p
i,1
denotes effort, Vi(pi,1) the corresponding disutility, and R1 the repayment
(principal and interest) to the bank. The same logic applies to period 2, while E[R2] repre-
4Similar to (Padilla and Pagano, 1997) this allows us to interpret p as the entrepreneurs choice variable.
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sents the expected interest rate given the behavior in period 15. If an entrepreneur does not
get any credit, his or her expected utility is equal to zero. Figure 2 illustrates the 1-period











Fig. 2. Entrepreneurial disutility and utility: Functional form of the partial disutility of effort and
partial utility for one period.
As illustrated in figure 1, entrepreneurs choose their effort levels prior to borrowing in
each period, while their effort is non-observable and non-contractible6. As a result, interest
rates cannot be conditioned on an individual entrepreneur’s probability of repayment. How-
ever, interest rates will depend on the average ex-ante repayment probability of previous
generations, which is accessible via the information system. In addition, project returns are
observable and contractible by the lending bank7.
Eventually, the fraction of plums in the market is denoted by the uniformly distributed
random variable θ ∈ (0, 1)8. This distribution of plums and lemons is common knowledge.
The historic average success probabilities of each type are known to the lending banks in the
traditional information sharing regime and common knowledge in the blockchain regime.
5Note that the sub- and superscripts will be more detailed in the following sections and change according
to the analytic scenarios (i.e. information regimes and switching). However, for the sake of simplicity, we
refrain from reporting all sub- and superscripts here
6Practical examples include hiring a good manager, preparing a good business plan, or the potential of a
project itself. For outsiders and non-experts, such as lending banks, these activities and project character-
istics are hard to verify. In addition, their qualitative nature makes them hard to enforce in court (Padilla
and Pagano, 2000).
7Contractibility of project returns ensures that in case of success the entrepreneur must repay the loan,
while their observability ensures that the actual project outcome (i.e. success or default at the end of a
period) is only observed by the lending bank and not any outside banks.
8This ensures that there is at least one plum or lemon in the market.
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Banks. Banks can raise funds for one period at a gross interest rate of R ≥ R̄ > 1
(principal and interest) at the beginning of each period9, offer one-period loan contracts to
the entrepreneurs, and compete in interest rates. Consequently, each bank maximizes its
expected profits given the average probability of success of plums and lemons by setting the
interest rates in period 1 and 2.
While providing credit, banks face adverse selection ex-ante due to the non-observable
and moral hazard ex-post due to the non-contractible nature of entrepreneurial effort levels.
During the initial engagement with an entrepreneur in period 1, banks can observe project
outcomes and share this information with each other at the end of period 1. To mitigate the
adverse selection problems in the imperfect information regime, they use the Bayes’ Rule to
update their beliefs based on shared default information. In the case of perfect information,
they can acquire type information at zero costs. Conditional on the level of information











Rj,t + (1− θ)pLRj,t − R̄
]
, with j ∈ {H,L, P} and t ∈ {1, 2}. (2)
At the beginning of period 1, banks have no information about entrepreneurial quality
and compete for the whole market. As a result banks are unable to differentiate between
plums and lemons, offer a pooling rate RP,1, and share the market equally. In period 2,
banks still compete in prices and share the market equally but have more information about
entrepreneurs. In consequence, they offer either risk-adjusted pooling rates RP,2(0) and
RP,2(R) conditioned on default under imperfect or type-specific rates RH,2 and RL,2 under
perfect information.
Solution concept. In order to analyze the impact of the blockchain’s public record, we
examine and compare the following combinations of information regimes and access scope:
While banks have either imperfect or perfect information and always have access to the
information system, entrepreneurs stay uninformed with a traditional access scope. In the
blockchain regime on the other hand, public access to the information systems system en-
ables entrepreneurs to learn about the average success probabilities of plums and lemons.
Comparing these two information regimes and access scopes allows us to examine the extent
to which the quality and availability of information provokes behavioral changes of plums
and lemons. To do so, we look for subgame perfect equilibria by applying the following
9This assumption requires banks to pay back their funds at the end of each period and roll over to new
funding at the beginning of the next period. If they cannot repay funds at the end of a period, they go
bankrupt an have to quit business. As a result they set their interest rates to break even in each period
independently of other previous or following periods.
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rationale:
• Banks act simultaneously and maximize their profits by setting period 1 and 2 interest
rates given the average historic success probabilities of plums and lemons pH and pL.
In consequence, the vectors (RP,1), (RH,2, RL,2), and (RP,2(0), RP,2(R)) constitute a
subgame perfect equilibrium for the banking subgames in period 1 and 2 respectively.
• Entrepreneurs choose their individual effort levels p
i,t
simultaneously to maximize their
expected utility over both periods, correctly anticipating the interest rates in period 1
and 2, while taking the effort levels of the other entrepreneurs as given.
Remarks. Note that while the distribution of entrepreneurial types and their average
success probabilities are common knowledge among banks, the allocation of good and bad
entrepreneurs to the market fractions [0, θ] and (θ, 1] needs to be observed in period 1.
Intuitively speaking, banks know how many good and bad entrepreneurs are in the market
and the difference ∆a between them but are not able to distinguish between them on an
individual level. To focus on the impact of the non-discriminatory disclosure of information
that comes with blockchain usage, we do not vary the scope of the information sharing
arrangement.
To keep the model simple, neither banks nor entrepreneurs discount profits or utility, we
do not consider costs for information acquisition or sharing, and each entrepreneur’s wealth
is equal to zero when applying for a loan10. Furthermore, note that while past defaults do
not have any impact on the investors’ wealth level, information about past defaults does as
it is recorded and shared by the lending bank. To improve accessibility and readability, a
list of variables, their scope, and a brief description is given in the appendix A.
10More specifically, we assume that the entrepreneurs consume the profits of successful projects imme-
diately, and thus start with no collateral or any other capital from previous projects. In case of default,




As stated before, a core feature that enables blockchain-based systems to function inde-
pendently from central authorities is the public availability of the underlying transactional
database. However, besides reducing adverse selection effects and moral hazard on the
banking side, access to the blockchain’s historic record also enables entrepreneurs to gather
information about each others qualities. As a result, public system access allows individual
entrepreneurs to direct their behavior in order to deceive banks and facilitate misjudgment.
To analyze whether and how this potential for deception might affect markets’ functioning
and outcomes, we establish the banking perspective in the first subsection (4.1). In section
4.2, we build on the resulting interest rates to investigate the motivation of switching and
staying plums and lemons to mimic their respective counterparts given different information
system configurations. Eventually, section 4.3 combines both perspectives and examines the
welfare effects of increased transparency that comes with blockchain adoption on a market
level. Appendix B provides proofs of propositions 1 to 12 (B.1) and supportive calculus for
the profits and the utility of banks and entrepreneurs (B.2).
4.1. Banking Perspective
To establish the market environment for entrepreneurs, we characterize the banking equi-
librium first. To find the equilibrium rates charged in a partly competitive market with
shared default information, we build on the approaches of Padilla and Pagano (1997) and
Padilla and Pagano (2000) and use backward induction, while taking entrepreneurial ef-
fort levels and quality differences as given. To simplify our analyses, we assume that the









The banks set period 1 and period 2 interest rates to break even given their cost of capital




, while competition erodes monopoly rents. At the
beginning of period 2, entrepreneurs can switch banks and banks use the information about
period 1 to assess entrepreneurial quality and charge risk-adjusted interest rates in period
2. In the case of imperfect information (i.e. default information), the information system
allows the banks to separate defaulters and non-defaulters and Bayesian learning leads to
two pooling equilibria. For perfect information on the other hand, banks can acquire type
information based on period 1 performance from the information system to separate plums
and lemons and charge adequate interest rates. In period 1, the absence of information leads
to a uniform pooling rate. From this starting point, we apply backward induction in order
to find the equilibrium interest rates within each information regime and period.
16
4.1.1. Assessment of Entrepreneurs with Imperfect Information
Suppose that the banks share the market equally in period 1, each bank observes project
outcomes at the end of period 1, and shares default information consequently. At the be-
ginning of period 2, each bank accesses the information system and utilizes the default
information to offer entrepreneurs a pooling rate conditional on period 1 project outcomes.
More specifically, the bank uses Bayes’ rule, to approximate whether a customer is good or
bad conditional on period 1 default and given the distribution of types and their average
success probabilities. Figure 3 illustrates the resulting probability structure. Based on this
structure, µ(H|R) denotes a bank’s posterior belief at the beginning of period 2 that an
entrepreneur who was successful in period 1 is a plum. Conversely, µ(H|0) is the posterior
probability of being a plum conditional on failure in period 1. The posterior probabilities








) = pLµ(L) = 1− θ
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Fig. 3. Probability structure: Structure of a priori success probabilities of plums and lemons.
of plums and lemons are equal to equations (3), (4), (5), and (6) conditional on success and
default in period 1. Moreover, the update beliefs can be interpreted as the probability that































µ(L|0) = 1− µ(H|0) = (1− pL)(1− θ)
θ(1− p
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Proposition 1 implements this notion and formalizes the banks’ perception of project risk
in period 2. Intuitively speaking, this means that in a market with both types and lending
not all plums will be successful and not all lemons will default, while the probability for
success (default) is higher for plums (lemons). As a result, default information is helpful to
approximate effort levels but not as good as having perfect information.
Proposition 1. Sharing default information at the end of period 1 enables banks to approx-
imate the quality of entrepreneurs but still bears the risk of an incorrect assessment. As a
result, banks regard defaulted entrepreneurs as riskier, underestimate the success probabilities

















4.1.2. Period 2 Interest Rates
Imperfect information. To determine the interest rates offered in period 2, the banks
utilize the default information from the information system to adjust its beliefs about plums
and lemons. In consequence, they weight the success probabilities of defaulters with µ(H|0)
and µ(L|0) and the success probabilities of non-defaulters with µ(H|R) and µ(L|R) and a










































Competitive pressure ensure that expected profits are equal to 0 and each bank offers








if p′i ≤ pi ≤ p′′i ,
R if R̄
R




In equation (8), p′i and p
′′










= 0 when both types




> 0). For success probabilities outside of these
intervals, the pooling rate would exceed the expected return to successful entrepreneurs, and
thus the banks cannot charge more than the project return R.
The same logic applies to successful entrepreneurs and thus the interest rate offered to








, if p′′i ≤ pi ≤ p′′i
R, if R̄
R
≤ pi < p′i or p′′i < pi ≤ 1
no lending, otherwise,
(9)
while p′i and p
′′










= 0. Again, banks cannot charge more than the full project return R
for values of pi outside the optimal intervals. In both cases default and success non lending
occurs for effort levels below R̄
R
. This also includes situations, where only one type exerts
positive effort and the other exerts no effort at all (i.e. p
H
= 0 or p
L
= 0).
If one bank would undercut its rivals and charge interest rates below RP,2(0) or RP,2(R)
it would win the competition but make a loss on average. More specifically, undercutting
RP,2(0) would draw all defaulters and undercutting RP,2(R) all successful entrepreneurs.
However, neither of these rates complies with the bank’s break-even condition, as they both
would underestimate the actual distribution of plums and lemons among defaulters and non-
defaulters. For interest rates greater than RP,2(0) or RP,2(R), no entrepreneur would agree
to lend and the offering bank would not be able to repay its funding and simply go out of
business. In total, banks do not earn any rents on entrepreneurs as the expected gains on
plums are offset by the expected losses generated by lemons mixed in the pools of defaulters
and non-defaulters.
Perfect information. In contrast to imperfect information, an information system with
value-adding information broker allows each bank learn about the types of entrepreneurs
before offering interest rates in period 2. This type information enables them to separate
plums and lemons and charge perfectly discriminatory prices conditional on the type assess-


























= 0 yields the interest rate of-
fered to plums (11), while competition prevents efficient undercutting or the extraction of
informational rents.
RH,2 =
 R̄pH , if pH ≥ R̄Rno lending, otherwise. (11)
Consistent with the approach for plums, we find the type-specific interest rate offered to




= 0 for RL,2.
RL,2 =
 R̄pL , if pL ≥ R̄Rno lending, otherwise. (12)
Similar to imperfect information, lending at a rate better (i.e. lower) than RH,2 or RL,2
would allow a bank to win the competition for plums or lemons while serving them at a loss.
Charging an interest rate higher than R (i.e. more than a project creates) on the other hand
would push entrepreneurs out of the market, and thus no lending would occur at all. As a
result banks earn 0 profits on both types.
4.1.3. Period 1 Interest Rates
In period 1, a new generation of entrepreneurs enters the market and engages in a business
relationship with the banks for the first time. As a result, banks do not posses any knowledge
about individual characteristics of entrepreneurs and and thus offer an uniform pooling rate
to plums and lemons to compensate this lack of information. This leads to the following

















Again, competition erodes monopoly rents, enforces the 0 profits for all banks, and leads
to
RP,1 =











formalize the bank’s break-even thresholds for all
combinations of entrepreneurial efforts (i.e. p
i
∈ [0, 1], i ∈ {H,L}). As indicated above,
charging a rate higher than RP,1 would allow competing banks to undercut profitably, while
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offering a rate below RP,1 would create a loss on average. In addition, for lending to occur,
the period 1 interest must not exceed the total return R entrepreneurs can extract from
projects in the case of success. With respect to their funding, banks have to pay back their
investors at the end of each period and roll over their funding. As a result, they have to
break even in each period, and thus cannot take a loss in period 1 in order to win the
competition for plums in period 2. Furthermore, period 1 interests between banks are equal
in equilibrium, and thus banks share the market equally while making zero profits. More
specifically, banks earn a profit on plums, which is offset by the loss incurred from lending
to lemons.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, interest rates vary with the information available to the banks
and rates under perfect information bracket less transparent regimes. In addition, banks can
never charge more than the project return without risking a market collapse.
R̄ ≤ RH,2 ≤ RP,2(R) ≤ RP,1 ≤ RP,2(0) ≤ RL,2 ≤ R
4.2. Entrepreneurial Perspective
In contrast to the assumption in section 4.1, entrepreneurial success is not exogenous
but determined by the effort an individual entrepreneur invests in his or her project. As
a result, effort choices arise endogenously and depend on the disutility a specific level of
effort creates, the interest rates charged by the banks, and project returns. As a result, we
characterize the equilibrium efforts of plums and lemons in this section and examine how
the public transparency that comes with the use of a blockchain-based information system
affects individual choices.
For our comparative analyses, we distinguish between the choices of uninformed and in-
formed entrepreneurs given imperfect and perfect information: Uninformed entrepreneurs
maximize their total utility without any information about their peers. This baseline setup
represents the characteristics of an information system with a traditional access scope. In-
formed entrepreneurs on the other hand, can costlessly acquire information about the average
success probabilities of plums and lemons from past generations. This setup formalizes the
characteristics of a blockchain-based information system, which does not discriminate be-
tween users and disseminates (historic) information equally among banks, plums, and lemons.
This knowledge allows entrepreneurs to mimic their respective counterparts in period 1 in
order to change the banks’ perception, and thus interest rates in period 2. Note that the
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ability to mimic does not depend on the presence of an information broker as entrepreneurs
know their own type. Instead, they simply compute the average success probabilities from
the default information of past generations to guide their behavior and set period 1 efforts.
As a result, the potential behavioral changes are solely driven by the information system’s
access scope and not its informativeness.
In the following subsections, we derive the equilibrium effort levels and the resulting
utility of individual entrepreneurs given imperfect and perfect information on the banking
side and a limited and full access scope on the entrepreneurial side. In addition, we utilize
comparative statics to investigate, how changing behavior in period 1 affects effort levels in
period 2 and under which system configurations (information regimes / access scopes) utility
improves. Figure 4 summarizes the underlying scenarios, highlights the level of information

























Fig. 4. Information system configurations and analytic scenarios: This matrix illustrates the scope
of our comparative analysis and summarizes how the information regime and access scope vary with the
system’s configuration. Arrows indicate comparative analyses.
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4.2.1. Uninformed Entrepreneurs
Effort choices under imperfect information. In the imperfect information regime,
banks cannot distinguish between plums and lemons but try to approximate entrepreneurial
quality based on the observed and shared default information from period 1. As a result,
banks offer the pooling rates RP,2(0) and RP,2(R) conditional on period 1 project outcomes.
Both, plums and lemons, incorporate this in their individual rationale and the utility over
two periods is equal to equation (15), where ∆R = RP,2(0) − RP,2(R) represents the price


















































In addition, entrepreneurs do not posses any knowledge about the success probabilities of
their peers. As a result, they have no means to guide behavioral changes and choose their
efforts to maximize total utility. In consequence, deriving and solving the first order condition























takes the value of 1, if the prospect of high net returns in period 2 would
push effort beyond 100% and the value of 0 if no lending occurs11. Figure 5 picks up the
rationale of entrepreneurs outlined in equations (15) and (16) by illustrating marginal costs
(MCi,t), revenues (MRi,t), and the resulting equilibrium effort levels of plums and lemons
in periods 1 and 212. It also highlights that plums always choose higher effort levels than
lemons as success is cheaper for them. The magnitude of this difference depends on the
quality difference ∆a > 0 between both types. In addition, the prospect of a lower price in
period 2 incentivizes entrepreneurs to invest more effort in period 1 than in period 2.
Proposition 3. In the imperfect information equilibrium, uninformed plums always exert




∀t ∈ {1, 2}. In addition, both types





11No lending occurs in cases, whenever pU
i,t
is too low to allow the banks to break even.
12The linearity of marginal costs and revenues, and thus the uniqueness of equilibria arises from the
quadratic nature of the disutility of effort chosen for this study. Note that more cost functions with a higher
degree or other functional forms may lead to multiple equilibria. However, we are confident that for this
initial study a simple cost function suffices and leave more complex model setups with more complex or more


































Fig. 5. Effort choices of uninformed entrepreneurs under imperfect information: The loci MRi,t
depict the marginal return to effort for each type i ∈ {H,L} and period t ∈ {1, 2}. Similarly MCi,t illustrates
the type- and time-specific marginal disutility (i.e. cost) of effort. Solid lines represent plums and dashed
lines lemons. The intersection points H and L define equilibria for plums and lemons, respectively. The
horizontal line at R represents the social return to effort in each period.
Effort choices under perfect information. In the perfect information regime, an in-
formation broker evaluates period 1 performance of entrepreneurs and thereby allows banks
to separate plums and lemons and offer type-specific interest rates to them. In consequence,
their behavior in period 1 qualifies entrepreneurs to lend at either RH,2 or RL,2 ≥ RH,2 in





























However, without access to the information system entrepreneurs do not have any infor-
mation how to behave in period 1, in order to qualify for a lower rate. In consequence, they
anticipate interest rates offered in period 2 correctly and in compliance with their type and
maximize total utility accordingly. Similar to the imperfect information regime, deriving the





















assumes the value of 0 without lending and 1 if net returns are too high.
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Figure 6 illustrates the equilibrium effort choices of plums and lemons in periods 1 and 2
and highlights differences between types and changes between periods. While entrepreneurs
are pooled in period 1, the separating equilibrium in period 2 enhances the impact of quality
differences between types and induces plums to increase and lemons to lower their effort
in period 2. More specifically, offering discriminatory interest rates disables the stochastic
price effect and thereby prevents entrepreneurs from indirectly profiting from higher efforts
in period 1.
Proposition 4. Under perfect information, plums always exert greater equilibrium effort




∀t ∈ {1, 2}. In addition, the separation in period 2 prevents








































Fig. 6. Effort choices of uninformed entrepreneurs under perfect information: The loci MRi,t
depict the marginal return to effort for each type i ∈ {H,L} and period t ∈ {1, 2}. Similarly MCi,t illustrates
the type- and time-specific marginal disutility (i.e. cost) of effort. Solid lines represent plums and dashed
lines lemons. The intersection points H and L define equilibria for plums and lemons, respectively. The
horizontal line at R represents the social return to effort in each period.
4.2.2. Informed Entrepreneurs
In contrast to uninformed entrepreneurs, informed plums and lemons have access to
information about the average success probabilities of previous generations stored in the
historic record of the blockchain-based information system. This information allows them to
direct their behavior in period 1 and mimic the respective other type −i in order to deceive
the bank they are lending from. Formally, we implement this notion by setting period 1
effort levels of informed entrepreneurs to period 1 choices of the respective other type from
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the uninformed scenario. This way a lemon can look like a plum at the end of period 1 and
vice versa.
To investigate whether such behavior occurs, we examine its potential impact on utility
in period 1 (∆Ui,1) and period 2 (∆Ui,2). In period 1, mimicking always creates a utility
loss, because it requires a shift away from the optimal choices identified in section 4.2.1.





) to make mimicking profitable. Eventually, the total change in utility ∆Ui =∑
t∈{1,2}∆Ui,t quantifies this net impact of mimicking over time. If total utility increases,
mimicking is a dominant strategy. In addition to the motivation to mimic, we dismantle
utility effects into their components and identify changes in the realized return to effort, the
related cost, and period 2 prices as effect channels.
Recall that the ability to mimic does not depend on the information regime. However,
perfect and imperfect information still affect the banking equilibrium (i.e. interest rates),
and thus indirectly affect mimicking. Also note that setting period 1 efforts to fixed value
limits the choice of entrepreneurs to the effort exerted in period 2. To find these period 2
choices, we apply the first order condition to entrepreneurial utility and solve it for p
i,2
.
Effort choices under imperfect information. Under imperfect information, banks have
to rely on default information to approximate the characteristics of plums and lemons. As
a result, they offer the pooling rates RP,2(0) and RP,2(R) conditional on period 1 project
outcomes. From an entrepreneurial perspective, the uncertainty on the banking side creates
a stochastic price effect ∆P that translates the impact of behavioral changes from period 1





















































In addition, access to the information system supplies them with behavioral information





. Solving the resulting first order condition with fixed period 1 efforts















takes the value 0 without lending and is capped at 1. In period 1, the imbalance
between the realized return and the corresponding costs, created by changing efforts, pushes
entrepreneurs out of their equilibrium as MRi,1(p
U
−i,1
) 6= MCi,1(pU−i,1). Moreover, changing
period 1 efforts shifts entrepreneurs to a new equilibrium period 2, where realized returns and




). However, this new equilibrium is
still affected by the behavioral change in period 1, as the inter-temporal stochastic price effect
indirectly translates the direction and strength of effort changes to period 2. In conjunction
with proposition 3 this indicates that plums continue to lower their effort levels in period 2
after behaving like lemons in period 1. The same logic applies to lemons but with an inverse
direction as they raise their efforts to mimic plums.














in period 2 as well.
To examine the impact on utility, we take a closer look at utility changes in periods














). As a result, the positive cost effect that comes with lower
efforts cannot offset the associated negative return effect. In period 2, plums are furthermore
locked-in to their inefficient behavior in period 1 via the price effect and the utility loss spills
over to period 2 (∆UH,2 < 0). In total, the utility losses in periods 1 and 2 sum up to
∆UH < 0 and indicate that mimicking does not provide any benefits to plums.
For lemons, the analysis is a bit more complex: While deviation from equilibrium also
leads to utility losses ∆UL,1 < 0 in period 1





a lower expected interest rate in period 2 (proposition 5). Moreover, the costs for reaching
this new equilibrium are borne in period 1, and a utility gain ∆UL,2 > 0 occurs in period
2. More specifically, the price effect outweighs the increasing costs associated with higher
efforts. However, in total these gains cannot outweigh the loss in period 1, and thus the




L,2 remains negative as period 1 costs dominate. In
consequence, lemons do not profit from changing their behavior in period 1 either.
Proposition 6. Mimicking does not constitute a dominant strategy under imperfect infor-















As result, proposition 6 indicates that the introduction of a blockchain-based information
system does not induce entrepreneurs to deviate from their equilibrium efforts without the









analytic service of an information broker. Moreover, if they would exhibit deceptive behavior
in period 1 they are locked-in to their inefficient choice and their utility would decrease even
further. Figure 7 illustrates the behavioral changes of plums and lemons in period 1, their
impact on period 2 efforts, the related trade-offs, and the utility gains and losses in an
exemplary manner.
Effort choices under perfect information. Under perfect information, the banks can
distinguish between plums and lemons and are able to offer type-specific interest rates RH,2 ≤
RL,2 in period 2. As a result, behavioral changes in period 1 create a deterministic price






























Moreover, the extended access scope of the information system enables plums to learn
about the average success probabilities of their respective counterparts and eventually mimic




and solving the resulting first
order condition for p
i,2










takes the value of 0 without lending and cannot be higher than 1. How-
ever, the deviation from the uninformed equilibrium in period 1 creates an imbalance between
returns and costs as MRi,1(p
U
−i,1
) 6= MCi,1(pU−i,1) and leads to new period 2 equilibria for both
types. In these equilibria banks charge either RH,2 or RL,2 to entrepreneurs who pretended
to be plums or lemons in period 1. As a result, decreasing period 1 efforts to pU
L,1
crushes
(plums’) and increasing period 1 efforts to pU
H,1
boosts (lemons’) net returns in period 2.
Similar to the imperfect information regime, this indicates that mimicking in period 1 is
followed by a behavioral change with the same direction in period 2.
Proposition 7. Consistent with the imperfect information regime, entrepreneurs who com-




, are locked-in to their behav-










From a utility perspective, plums still experience a utility loss ∆UH,1 < 0 when they lower

































































(d) Lemons Period 2
Fig. 7. Effort choices of informed entrepreneurs under imperfect information: The loci MRi,t
depict the marginal return to effort for each type i ∈ {H,L}, period t ∈ {1, 2}. Similarly MCi,t illustrates
the type- and time-specific marginal disutility (cost) of effort. Solid lines represent plums and dashed lines
lemons. If marginal returns of costs change with the information regime we indicate this difference with U
for uninformed and I for informed entrepreneurs. Otherwise, no indication is given. Behavioral changes that
come with the blockchain regime in period 1 and the resulting impact in period 2 are marked in red. More
specifically, the utility changes ∆U ji,t of plums and lemons are illustrated by a filling with a red pattern, while
red arrows indicate the direction of changes and corresponding effects. In period 1, the intersection point
U defines the equilibrium before blockchain usage, whereas I represents the adjusted behavior of mimicking
entrepreneurs. Similarly, in period 2 U highlights the equilibrium efforts before blockchain usage and I the
equilibrium outcomes that result from deceptive behavior in period 1. The horizontal line at R represents
the social return to effort in each period.
true in period 2, where the inefficient behavior from period 1 spills over to period 2 via an
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increased interest rate RL,2 ≤ RH,2 and creates an additional utility loss ∆UH,2 < 0. In
total, this finding is consistent with the prediction for imperfect information and highlights
that plums are not able to derive any utility gains from mimicking - independent of the
information regime.
Proposition 8. Under perfect information, mimicking does not constitute a dominant strat-






















)) and loose utility as a result (∆UL,1 < 0). However, deterministic nature of
the inter-temporal price effect allows them to maximize their gains from mimicking. More
specifically, in combination with the resulting return effect, the price effect outweighs the
costs associated with higher efforts and creates a utility gain in period 2 (∆UL,2 > 0).
Eventually, the utility gains in period 2 are strong enough to offset the costs of mimicking
from period 1 and total utility increases ∆UL > 0.
Proposition 9. In contrast to plums, the historic performance information disclosed by a















. In consequence, mimicking is a dominant strategy under imperfect informa-
tion.
Moreover, the resulting net utility gain depends on the difference between the relative
interest rate improvement (relative price effect) and the increase in the disutility of effort it

















In total, this indicates that the introduction of a blockchain-based information systems
only induces lemons to mimic plums if banks can be deceived (i.e. when they have type
information). Plums on the other hand, do not experience any benefits from additional
information. In addition, mimicking entrepreneurs are locked-in to their inefficient choice -
irrespective of their type. Figure 8 summarizes these findings and illustrates the behavioral
changes of plums and lemons in period 1, their impact on period 2 efforts, and indicates the



























































(d) Lemons Period 2
Fig. 8. Effort choices of informed entrepreneurs under perfect information: The loci MRi,t
depict the marginal return to effort for each type i ∈ {H,L}, period t ∈ {1, 2}. Similarly MCi,t illustrates
the type- and time-specific marginal disutility (cost) of effort. Solid lines represent plums and dashed lines
lemons. If marginal returns of costs change with the information regime we indicate this difference with U
for uninformed and I for informed entrepreneurs. Otherwise, no indication is given. Behavioral changes that
come with the blockchain regime in period 1 and the resulting impact in period 2 are marked in red. More
specifically, the utility changes ∆U ji,t of plums and lemons are illustrated by a filling with a red pattern, while
red arrows indicate the direction of changes and corresponding effects. In period 1, the intersection point
U defines the equilibrium before blockchain usage, whereas I represents the adjusted behavior of mimicking
entrepreneurs. Similarly, in period 2 U highlights the equilibrium efforts before blockchain usage and I the
equilibrium outcomes that result from deceptive behavior in period 1. The horizontal line at R represents
the social return to effort in each period.
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4.3. Market Perspective
Section 4.2 highlights that entrepreneurs - or more specifically lemons - only have an
incentive to mimic their counterparts when banks can observe type information. Plums
on the other hand have no incentive to do so, irrespective of the information regime. In
consequence, we focus on the perfect information regime in our welfare analysis. Moreover,
we set the interest rates offered and consequently charged by banks as exogenously given,
while their order is defined by proposition 2. This ensures the validity of our comparative
analysis and formalizes the notion that banks use the information from past generations to
determine the interest rates offered to the current one. In addition, banks act as mediators
between the capital market and entrepreneurs, and thus do not generate welfare directly.
Taking these considerations into account, we define total welfare as the aggregate utility




































To evaluate the welfare effects of blockchain adoption, we compare equation (24) with
the welfare generated by uninformed plums and lemons while holding the information regime
fixed (perfect information). The resulting welfare change ∆W is defined as the difference
between the informed scenario outlined above and total welfare with completely uninformed
entrepreneurs.
















) = (1− θ)∆UL (25)
Eventually, ∆W depends on the share of lemons in the market (1− θ) and is driven by
the utility gains they experience from mimicking (23). The utility of plums does not affect
welfare, because they do not change their behavior. In addition, there is no welfare effect
on the banking side, as banks earn zero profits in their role as mediators and their costs of
capital are constant and equal to R̄.
Proposition 10. Driven by the utility gains of mimicking lemons, the introduction of a
blockchain-based information system increases the total welfare of our economy as ∆W > 0.
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However, this entrepreneurial perspective on welfare does not consider the special role of
banks and how they are affected by the behavioral changes of informed lemons. As media-
tors between the capital market and entrepreneurs, they manage entrepreneurial risks and
transform denomination to allocate funds to plums and lemons efficiently in each period.
To do so, they assess entrepreneurial quality, pool and separate risk accordingly, and offer
credit conditional on their assessment, while perfect competition enforces the zero profit
constraint. In consequence, they build their assessment on the historic information acquired
from the information system and offer risk-adjusted interest rates to break-even given the
average success probabilities learned from past generations. In the current generation, how-
ever, the introduction of a blockchain-based information system supplies entrepreneurs with
additional information about their counterparts and thereby induces lemons to change their
behavior. As a result, the actual effort levels exerted in period 1 and 2 do not comply with
the break-even conditions E[Π1]
!
= 0 and E[Π2]
!
= 0 anymore. In the period 1 pooling




) and thus the real-
ized profit ΠI1 > 0. In period 2 however, the realized profit Π
U
2 < 0 as mimicking lemons
wrongfully qualify for RH,2 and the quality difference ∆a > 0 prevents risk-adequate effort
levels.
Proposition 11. While the behavioral change of lemons improves welfare for the current





. As result banks are not able to roll over funding at the end of period 2, go bankrupt,
and future generations of entrepreneurs are cut off the capital market.
Note that in all other scenarios, the introduction of a blockchain-based information system
does not affect welfare as there is no incentive for rational agents to adapt their behavior
given additional quality information. However, when entrepreneurs are prone to irrational
behavior - as it is often the case in retail markets14 - deviation from the uniformed equilibrium
can harm welfare significantly ceteris paribus. For mimicking plums this is always the case,
because they have to lower effort levels in period 1 to mimic lemons (proposition 3 and 4)
and the resulting lock-in effects (proposition 5 and 7) push them to equilibria with lower
utility in both periods (proposition 6 and 8). In addition, banks are not able to break even on
them anymore, go bankrupt at the end of period 1, and the market collapses. Lemons on the
other hand always experience a utility gain in period 2, because they receive a better price
when mimicking plums in period 1. Under imperfect information however, this gain does not
outweigh the costs of mimicking created in period 1 and total utility decreases (proposition
14There is a multitude of studies that show the existence of irrational behavior empirically (Poteshman
and Serbin, Poteshman and Serbin; Shapira and Venezia, 2001) and analyze the underlying biases and effects
(Patel, Zeckhauser, and Hendricks, 1991; Subrahmanyam, 2007).
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6). While raising effort levels in period 1 is beneficial for banks, the same rationale as
in proposition 11 drives them into banruptcy in period 2. Possible reasons for irrational
behavior include the misinterpretation (i.e. wrong assessment) of historic data, the limited
ability of entrepreneurs to access and process the information from the blockchain-based
information system, or simply flawed strategic rationales.
5. Discussion
However, the analysis in section 4 does not consider long term effects that may arise with
a longer lifespan of individual generations or overlapping generations. Figure 9 illustrates
these model variations and forms a foundation for the following discussion of related effects.
In the case of a longer lifespan, generations live for 2 < m < ∞ periods instead of two.
As a result, lemons can choose to change their behavior and mimic plums at the beginning
of each period. Figure 9(a) illustrates a generation with a m period lifespan and highlights
potential timings for opportunistic behavior. If they decide to mimic before the first period,
they can improve loan conditions in period 2 but cut themselves off the capital market for all
subsequent periods (I). A behavioral change before some intermediate period m−n−1 where
2 < n < m creates a positive utility in each period including m − n − 1 and an additional
utility improvement in period m−n (II). However, as a a result of the market collapse at the
end of period m− n, entrepreneurs are not able to implement any more projects and utility
is equal to zero for the rest of their life. If lemons deceive banks in penultimate period m−2,
they can fund and implement a project in each period and increase their utility in the last
period (III). In addition, they are not affected by the market collapse at the end of period
m and the following generations have to suffer the consequences. Equation (26) summarizes
the total utility generated in each case (I - III). Moreover, from t2 < tm−n−1 < tm directly
follows that betraying in the penultimate period m − 2 is the best strategy to maximize
utility, if we assume that interest rates are constant over time.
t2∑
t=t1










UL,t + ∆UL︸ ︷︷ ︸
(III)
(26)
Proposition 12. If the lifespan of a generation increases to m < ∞, mimicking in the
penultimate period m− 2 is a dominant strategy for lemons.
To discuss to effects of overlapping generations, we assume that each generation lives













(a) Generations with a longer lifespan
t = 0
. . .







Fig. 9. Model variations: This figure illustrates the timelines of actions of opportunistic lemons with a
lifespan of m <∞ periods as well as lemons with overlapping generations. In addition, 2 < n < m. Different
cases of opportunistic behavior are highlighted with arrows and superscripts (I) to (V).
illustrates resulting population structure for two generations. Each generation has the chance
to mimic the respective other type within their own generation in each period. However,
according to 12, lemons do not mimic plums between t = t0 and t = t1 (IV). Instead, they
increase their effort levels between t1 and t2 to extract the utility gain ∆UL at the end of
the third and last period of their life (V). As a result, the market collapses at t = t3 and the
second generation is not able to get funding for the third and last project. If the lemons of
the second generation are aware of this behavioral pattern, it is optimal for them to deceive
banks and mimic plums between t1 and t2 (i.e. the first period of their life) as well (V).
The resulting utility is equal to UL,t2 + UL,t3 + ∆UL, which is greater than UL,t2 + UL,t3 .
Note that this notion of overlapping generations does not consider interconnections between
generations, such as ancestry or heritage. In addition, we do not consider changing average
success probabilities as a result of the behavioral changes of the first generation.
Proposition 13. If entrepreneurial generations overlap each other, the first generation of
lemons that reaches the last period of their life triggers a cascade of opportunistic behavior.
As a result, all subsequent generations that still overlap with the first one will mimic in the
same period.
In addition, there are some other minor model variations and limitations, we will dis-
cuss briefly here. First, repeating the two-period lending game with an infinite number of
generations does not affect our findings in the long run. The market collapses, when one
generation of lemons decides to mimic plums and consequently all subsequent generations
loose access to the capital market. It is also important to note that the first generation is
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not able to deceive, because there is no information to guide their behavioral change stored
in the information system at t = 0. Second, in section 3 we assumed that neither banks
nor entrepreneurs discount profits or utility. Introducing a positive discount rate on the
entrepreneurial side would emphasize the timing of utility changes as today’s utility be-
comes more valuable than tomorrow’s. In consequence, the costs of mimicking in period 1
would increase, while its gains in period 2, and thus ∆UL would decrease. Third, relaxing
competition in the banking sector - for instance via relationship information - would allow
banks to extract rents from an informational monopoly, and thereby increase their ability
to compensate violations of their break-even condition. Similarly, a risk averse banking sec-
tor would incorporate a safety cushion in the break-even condition, and thus become more
robust towards opportunistic behavior. Finally, good entrepreneurs do not drop out of the
market, because they remain unaffected by the behavior of lemons and always experience
positive utility when implementing a project - if their effort levels are high enough to get a
funding. In a dynamic world however, this may change as banks adapt their behavior to the
take the consequences of misbehaving lemons into account.
6. Conclusion
In total, the analyses in section 4 and the extensions discussed in section 5 help us to de-
rive several lessons for blockchain ventures in research and practice. First and foremost, they
relate to research question 1 and indicate that the public disclosure of quality information
can give rise to opportunistic behavior. More specifically, we find that lemons can increase
their utility by behaving opportunistically, when information brokers, such as credit bureaus
or rating agencies, enhance the informativeness of the stored and shared data. In such mar-
ket environments, increasing period 1 efforts gives lemons access to better prices in period
2. To determine which effort levels qualify them as plums, they use the information from
the blockchain’s public record to learn about the average quality of plums and lemons and
adapt their behavior accordingly. The resulting utility gain is more pronounced for greater
price improvements, lower quality differences, and lower quality in general. In contrast, we
do not find any incentives for plums to behave opportunistically. Moreover, their decreasing
utility over both periods is in line with prior research such as Padilla and Pagano (2000) and
outlines the disciplinary effect increasing transparency can have. In opaque market environ-
ments, banks pool plums and lemons conditional in period 1 project outcomes and neither
plums nor lemons have an incentive to behave opportunistically.
Irrespective of the information regime, we furthermore observe lock-in effects across all
analytic scenarios and entrepreneurial types. As a result, plums (lemons) who lower (in-
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crease) their efforts in the first period will do the same in the subsequent one. The severity
of this effect is driven by the transparency of a market as well as price and quality differences
and reinforces the consequences of opportunistic behavior in period 1. While extraneous for
rational agents, erroneous decisions made by irrational agents can spill over to period 2 and
harm utility permanently as entrepreneurs are committed to their inefficient choice from
period 1.
From the market perspective taken in research question 2, the opportunistic behavior of
lemons creates a welfare gain within their own generation. The strength of this gain depends
on the share of lemons in the market (1− θ) and is driven by the utility gains of mimicking
lemons. However, the resulting unjustified access to better loan conditions harms the break-
even condition of banks and prevents them from breaking even. As a result, the banks are
not able to roll over funding, the supply side of the market collapses, and future generations
are cut off from funding. In all other scenarios, the combination of irrational behavior of
either plums or lemons or both and the following lock-in effects would harm welfare through
a negative utility effect, while the market still collapses.
Eventually, the findings hold across various model variations, while generations with a
longer lifespan experience an endgame effect and opportunistic behavior cascades through
overlapping generations. In addition, we are confident that they hold implications that go
beyond the market for credit and apply to other lemon markets, such as the used car or the
insurance market, as well.
With respect to research question 3 these findings furthermore indicate that blockchain
adoption can lead to market collapses in markets with a high level of transparency and intense
competition. To mitigate these issues, blockchain designers could refrain from using smart
contracts to implement value-adding services and analytic applications on the infrastruc-
ture level. In addition, using blockchain-based systems in environments prone to irrational
behavior - such as retail markets - can harm welfare and impede a market’s functioning
permanently.
In aggregate, we contribute to three research streams: First, we contribute to the growing
body of literature on the economics of blockchain by shedding light on the impact of the
blockchain’s public transparency paradigm on behavioral patterns in markets exposed asym-
metric information. Second, we contribute to the field of banking research by examining the
effect of the disclosure of quality information to the broad public. As a result, our findings
hold implications for the design of information sharing arrangements as well the shaping
of transparency regulations such as the Payment services directive of the European Union.
Third, we contribute to the body of blockchain adoption literature by highlighting the risks
of market-oriented application contexts. However, there are also various potential model
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extensions that go beyond the scope of this initial study. First and foremost, we limit our
analyses to comparative statics and believe that considering dynamic interactions between
banks and entrepreneurs could add another interesting dimensions to our results. We also
set the cost for information sharing and acquisition - and thus the information system itself -
to zero for both sides of the market. While adding a constant cost factor on both sides of the
market would simply shift interest rates to a higher and utility to a lower level, modelling
the actual costs of a blockchain-based systems is more complex15. In addition, we do not
consider switching costs, refrain form using a generalized functional form of the disutility of
effort, and exclude evolution of wealth on the entrepreneurial side and the role relationship
information and opportunistic behavior on the banking side. These aspects are interesting
and relevant extensions to consider in the context of public transparency and provide great
opportunities for future research.
15An initial study that analyzes such a mechanism is Saleh (2018). However, there is a multitude of
consensus mechanisms in the blockchain world that reach consensus on database updates and thus create
costs in different ways.
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions
A.1. Banks
Variable Scope Description
b > 1 Number of competing banks
R̄ [1, R] Gross interest rate banks pay to raise funds
Πt - Individual bank profits in period t
Rj,t [R̄, R] Interest rate offered to entrepreneurs
t {1,2} Lending period
j {H,L,P} Equilibrium characteristics (P = pooling, H,P = separating)
RP,1 [R̄, R] Period 1 pooling rate
RH,2 [R̄, R] Period 2 interest rate offered to plums
RL,2 [R̄, R] Period 2 interest rate offered to lemons
RP,2(0) [R̄, R] Period 2 pooling rate offered following default in period 1
RP,2(R) [R̄, R] Period 2 pooling rate offered following success in period 1
µ(H|R) [0, 1] Probability that a successful entrepreneur is a plum
µ(L|R) [0, 1] Probability that a successful entrepreneur is a lemon
µ(H|0) [0, 1] Probability that a defaulted entrepreneur is a plum
µ(L|0) [0, 1] Probability that a defaulted entrepreneur is a lemon
A.2. Entrepreneurs
Variable Scope Description
R > 1 Project return in the case of success
i H, L Entrepreneurial type
H - Good entrepreneur (plum)
L - Bad entrepreneur (lemon)
θ (0, 1) Share of plums in the market
1− θ (0, 1) Share of lemons in the market
a
i
> 0 Entrepreneurial quality of type i
pk
i,t
[0, 1] Effort level (success probability) of a type i entrepreneur in period t
k {U, I} Level of entrepreneurial information
U - Uninformed entrepreneur















) > 0 Total utility of type i entrepreneurs
MCki,t - Marginal costs of type i entrepreneurs in period t
MRki,t - Marginal returns of type i entrepreneurs in period t
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Appendix B. Proofs and Calculus
B.1. Proofs



























Perfect info.︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 2
While banks operate under full opacity in period 1, they acquire information about
entrepreneurial characteristics before their second offer in period 2. However, their ability
to distinguish between types depends on the features of the information system they acquire
the information from. Under perfect information, their approximation of effort levels (i.e.
success probabilities) is completely accurate. Under imperfect information on the other
hand, banks underestimate (overestimate) the effort levels of plums (lemons). To show this,
we compare the different information regimes and periods with each other.
To compare perfect with imperfect information, we have to consider the average effort

























< 1 is only true, if θ < 1. However, θ < 1
is also fulfilled by assumption as there is at least one lemon in the market. As a result, the first










(I). The same logic applies















. Again, both conditions are trivially fulfilled by assumption as
there is at least one lemon in the market and effort is more costly to lemons. In consequence,
the last part of proposition 1 proofs to be correct as well (II).


































































In total, this shows that when effort levels are positive and high enough to create lending,
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R represents the project return. RH,2 and RL,2 are the period 2 interest rates offered
to plums (11) and lemons (12) under perfect information. To break even under imperfect
information in period 2, banks offer either RP,2(0) or RP,2(R) conditional on period 1 default
(8) or success (9). RP,1 is the pooling rate banks offer without any information in period 1
(14). If a bank overcharges these break-even rates, its competitors can undercut profitably,
while undercutting creates a loss on average.
To investigate the strictly increasing relationship between interest rates, we plug the
interest rate formulas from sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 into the equation below and reduce
the resulting fractions to lose R̄. Finally, in combination with proposition 1 inverting the












































































Prop. 1⇒ RH,2 < RP,2(R) < RP,1 < RP,2(0) < RL,2
However, banks can never charge more than the project return R without risking a market
collapse, and thus all rates are capped by R for sufficiently low effort levels. In consequence,
”<” becomes ”≤”. In addition, if effort levels are below the banks’ break-even thresholds,
there is no lending. R̄ ≤ RH,2 follows directly from equation 11 and the assumption that
entrepreneurs cannot exert more than 100% effort (i.e. p
H
∈ [0, 1]). In total this shows that
proposition 2 holds and
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R̄ ≤ RH,2 ≤ RP,2(R) ≤ RP,1 ≤ RP,2(0) ≤ RL,2 ≤ R.






∀t ∈ {1, 2}




holds, when the numerator of pU
H,1
is greater than the numerator
of pU
L,1
, while the denominator of pU
H,1
is equal or lower than the denominator of pU
L,1
or vice
versa. To show that this is fulfilled for period 1 interest rates, we examine the relationship
between numerators (I) and denominators (II) in the following. In combination, (I) and (II)
























































































































To show that the proposed ” > ”-relationship also holds for period 2, we apply the same
logic as in period 1. While (II) is trivially satisfied by the assumption about the quality




































Similar to the relationship between type-specific effort levels, we compare numerators (I)

















⇔· · · > RP,1 +RP,2(0)− pi,1︸︷︷︸
≥1

























holds for all i ∈ {H,L}, and thus proposition 3 proofs to be true in
total.






∀t ∈ {1, 2}
To show that this proposition holds, we follow the same logic as in proposition 3. In
period 1, the numerator R−RP,1 - which results from the pooling of entrepreneurs in period
1 and the absence of stochastic price effects due to the distinct separation in period 2 - is
constant over types, and thus we only need to show that the inequality holds true for the



























In period 2, period 1 performance qualifies entrepreneurs for type-specific interest rates
RH,2 ≤ RL,2 (proposition 2). This relationship between interest rates charged to plums




























is true for all t ∈ {1, 2}.



























> 0⇒ RP,1 −RH,2
Prop. 2
≥ 0
In total, this shows that relationships formalized by proposition 4 hols over both types
and time.











For plums, plugging in the formulas from equations (16) and (20) highlights that the dif-
ference between period 2 efforts of uninformed and informed plums lies in the realization of




and simplifying the relationship































For lemons, the same logic applies but with an inverse direction (i.e. lemons raise their
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To show that this inequality holds for plums, we analyze the changes in utility illustrated
in Figures 7(a) and 7(b). In period 1, ∆UH,1 < 0 is trivially satisfied as the deviation from






(Prop. 3) creates an imbalance between marginal
costs and returns. To show that plums never experience utility gains from mimicking, we





























































Formally, this underlines that the lock-in effect creates an utility loss in period 2 (∆UH,2 <
0). In aggregate, these utility losses in period 1 and 2 indicate that mimicking does not















For lemons, the situation is a bit more complex: While deviation from equilibrium leads




in period 2 ((Prop. 5)) provides






























































However, to show that these utility gains cannot outweigh the utility loss in period 1, we





in all cases. Note that in the following, we compute the ∆UL from a cost perspective
∆UL = ∆U
U


























































































The inequality of part (I) follows from the following logic: To estimate a lower bound, we first
let a
L




> 0, this also pushes a
H
→ 0 and infinitely cheap effort consequently
raises effort levels for both types infinitely close to 1. As a result of these extremely high
effort levels and the minimal difference in quality, interest rates rise and converge to R, and
thus ∆(R)→ 0. If we take a look a the equation below, we can easily see that this movement
towards 0 is twice as fast for ∆R than for a
L
. In addition, the fraction-based functional form





, where α represents some distribution of entrepreneurs)
leads to an even stronger decrease compared to the quadratic and linear formalization of the
disutility and return created by efforts. In consequence, 2a
L
− ∆R always remains > 016,













−∆R2 > 0⇔ 2a
L
> ∆R





















is true. In ag-
gregate, the perspective of plums and lemons indicate that proposition 6 holds whenever
lending occurs (i.e. p
i,t
> 0 ∀i ∈ {H,L}, t ∈ {1, 2}).











16”>” holds furthermore true as we never reach 0.
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Comparing the perfect information interest rates banks offer to uninformed (18) and informed
















> 0⇔ −RH,2 − (−RL,2) > 0⇔ RL,2 −RH,2
Prop. 2
> 0
















> 0⇔ RL,2 −RH,2
Prop. 2
> 0
In total, this shows that plums and lemons are locked-in to their behavioral change from








. In addition, the strict inequality ”>” holds as long
as Ri,2 < R, i.e. as long as effort levels are high enough (see section 4.1.2).















Similar to imperfect information, plums experience an utility loss over both periods under
perfect information. In period 1, ∆UH,1 < 0 follows directly from MRH,1 > MCH,1. In




leads to a higher interest burden RL,2 ≥




H,2. In combination with the
resulting decline of effort, utility drops and ∆UH,2 < 0. To support that this reasoning holds
whenever lending occurs and efforts are high enough, we refer to proposition 7. Panels 8(a)

















































































>0 (when lending occurs)
> 0





















, and thus plums
do not experience any gains from mimicking.















In contrast to plums, under perfect information lemons experience an utility loss in period
1 (as MRL,1 < MCL,1) and an utility gain in period 2. However, unlike lemons in the
imperfect information regime, period 2 gains of mimicking can outweigh its cost in period 1,
thereby making deception in period 1 profitable. To investigate in which situations mimicking
provides a profitable alternative, we examine when the net utility gain over both periods
∆UL = ∆UL,2 −∆UL,1 > 0.


























































































































Eventually, the quality difference ∆a > 0 and its connection to interest rates via17 supports

























To evaluate the welfare effect ∆W of blockchain adoption, we compare the welfare generated
by informed entrepreneurs (i.e. mimicking lemons) with the welfare generated by uninformed
entrepreneurs. As the plums do not change their behavior, the ∆WH = 0. In addition, the
costs of capital R̄ are constant, and thus do not play a role in the comparison between
informed and uninformed lemons. As a result, ∆W is reduced to the utility change of
mimicking lemons, and thus ∆W > 0 directly follows from proposition 9 and our assumption
































































Proposition 11: Market collapse
To break even in the face of perfect competition, banks use the success probabilities of
past (uninformed generations) to compute adequate interest rates for plums and lemons.














However, when lemons change their the resulting success probabilities the break-even con-
17For details on the underlying logic, we refer to proposition 6, where we apply the same but inverse
rationale.
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R− R̄ != 0
⇔ (1− pH )θ
θ(1− p
H























































respectively yields the corresponding upper and lower limits for








for the period 1 defaulters. Applying














Period 1 Break-even success probabilities: In period 1, banks cannot distinguish
between entrepreneurial types and offer a pooling rate to both of them. However, to provide
lending at this rate, entrepreneurial effort levels need to allow banks to break even on the total
pool’s expected profits. For the lowest possible pi’s this means that RP,1 = R, while banks
require all project returns to break even. Based on the profits under perfect competition
θp
H
R + (1 − θ)p
L










In consequence, when p
L




= 0) has to






= 0) ≥ R̄
(1−θ)R , when plums have zero
success probability (III). Figure 10 illustrates the resulting lending areas for in greater detail




- such as we do in section 4.1
for instance - the lending area is limited to probability combinations that comply with this





























































Lending area A Lending area B
Fig. 10. Lending areas under full opacity and pooling.
51
B.2.2. Entrepreneurial Perspective
To find the optimal effort choices of entrepreneurs, we consider first and second order
conditions and apply the following four-step approach: Step 1 identifies potential optimal
effort levels in periods 1 and 2. Step 2 evaluates whether these choices are indeed maxima by
showing that the determinant of the hessian matrix |HUi | > 0 and ∂∂Ui∂pi,t∂pi,t < 0. Step 3 checks
whether the optimal effort levels lie within the defined range of pi ∈ (0, 1) Finally, step 4
compares entrepreneurial utility of the effort choices identified in step 1 with the utility at
the boundary points pi,t = 0 and pi,t = 1. However, we keep this step short, as the convexity
of utility trivially ensures that the argument holds for all combinations of boundary effort
choices.
The difference between plums and lemons lies in the marginal cost of effort (0 < ai < aL)




). In the uninformed scenarios, the limited ac-
cess scope of the information system prevents entrepreneurs from learning about other en-
trepreneurs’ behavior. As a result, they choose effort levels in periods 1 and 2 to maximize
their individual utility independently of each other. In informed scenarios, entrepreneurs
have knowledge about the average success probability of plums and lemons (from past gen-
erations), and thus can change their effort levels in period 1 in order to mimic the respective
other type. Based on this change, they maximize their utility by choosing effort levels in
period 2. In addition, the information available (imperfect/perfect) to the banks varies, and
thus interest rates change accordingly. Eventually, this results in four analytic scenarios:
Uninformed entrepreneurs who face imperfectly informed banks, uninformed entrepreneurs
who face perfectly informed banks, informed entrepreneurs who face imperfectly informed
banks, and informed entrepreneurs who face perfectly informed banks. To facilitate the un-
derstanding of the underlying rationale, we provide detailed calculations for the behavior of
uninformed entrepreneurs under imperfect information. For the sake of brevity however, we
limit the calculations for the remaining 3 scenarios to central results of each step.
Effort choices of uninformed entrepreneurs in the imperfect information regime:
In the imperfect information regime, banks have to rely on project outcomes from period
1 (i.e. default (0) or success (R)) to approximate entrepreneurial types. As a result, both
plums and lemons are offered a pooling rate dependent on default or success in period 1.





consequence, we formalize rationales from a general perspective and denote type-specific
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< 0 ⇒ pU
i,2
is a maximum





















≥ R−RP,2(0) ≥ 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
No lending for R < RP,2(0)
.
Even if plums do not exert effort in period 1, negative effort levels remain infeasible in



























∆R−RP,2(0) ≤ R−RP,2(R)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Best case period 2 net return
≤ 2a
i
Increasing the period 2 net return (in a best case scenario - i.e. when p
i,1
= 1) can
push plums’ equilibrium effort levels in period 2 beyond the domain of [0, 1]. However,
entrepreneurs cannot invest more than 100% effort. In consequence, we set pU
i,2
to 1, if




































)2 − (∆R)2 ≥ 0
⇔(2a
i






≥ 0 holds true, if the interest rate differential RP,2(0)−RP,2(R) = ∆R
does not outweigh the marginal costs of effort: 2a
i
≥ ∆R. We assume this to be true, as
interest rates usually differ on the decimal level in practical contexts (a difference of 2 would
be equal to 200 percentage points). Economically, this result indicates that in equilibrium
plums exert positive effort as along as the marginal punishment for default is lower than the
marginal cost of effort. The severity of punishment furthermore increases with the fraction











































⇔ R−RP,1︸ ︷︷ ︸









Period 2 net benefit
≤ 2a
i
Similar to period 2, increasing period 1 net returns and period 2 net benefits can lead
to equilibrium effort levels greater then 1 as Ui becomes strictly increasing. However, en-
trepreneurs still cannot invest more than 100% effort in each period. In consequence, we set
pU
i,1







Step 4: Maximum utility and comparison to boundary points
In combination with pi,t ∈ [0, 1], the convexity of the total and partial utility (period 1,





) is indeed a maximum and no boundary points offer higher











can be equal to 1. In these special
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situations maximum utility is realized at the boundary of the specified domain of pi,t.
Effort choices of uninformed entrepreneurs in the perfect information regime: In
contrast to imperfect information, the information broker in the perfect information regime
allows banks to acquire information about entrepreneurial types after period 1. As a result,
they are able to offer risk-adjusted interest rates conditional on an entrepreneur’s type at the
beginning of period 2. In consequence, we apply the following logic to find the equilibrium





































































































< 0 ⇒ pU
i,2
is a maximum
































Similar to the previous scenarios, high net returns can push pU
i,t
beyond 1, and thus we
set pU
i,t
:= 1 in these cases.
Step 4: Comparison to boundary points
The inferiority of boundary points follows directly from the (strict) convexity of UL.
Effort choices of informed entrepreneurs in the perfect information regime: We
implement the deceptive behavior of entrepreneurs by setting period 1 effort levels to a fixed
value pU
−i,1
drawn from the blockchain-based information system. To find period 2 choices,
we then use the resulting utility function and the conditional interest rates charged under












































































Step 2: Evaluation of optimal effort choices
The second order condition is satisfied, because of the convexity of Ui directly follows





< 0 ∀i ∈ {H,L}. In addition,
this holds true for both types, as marginal effort is strictly more expensive for lemons but
always positive (0 > aH > aH). As a result, p
I
i,2
proofs to be a maximum.
Step 3: Admissibility of optimal effort choices
The admissibility of pI
i,2
follows the same principle as in the other cases before: pI
i,2
is
greater than 0 as both numerator and denominator are both ≥ 0. In consequence, all pI
i,2
trivially qualify as admissible. With respect to the upper bound of p
i,2
≤ 1 we set pI
i,2
to
1, whenever high net returns or low marginal costs would push effort beyond 100%. More
specifically, we set pI
i,2
to 1, if R−RP,2(R) > 2ai and pIH,1 to 1.
Step 4: Comparison to boundary points
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Again, the convexity of total and partial utility - which follows directly from the strict




Effort choices of informed entrepreneurs in the perfect information regime: Sim-
ilar to imperfect information, entrepreneurs set period 1 efforts to effort levels from their
counterparts to mimic them. The lending bank then acquires this from the information sys-
tem at the beginning and offers a type-specific interest in the period 2 separating equilibrium.
















































Step 2: Evaluation of optimal effort choices
Analogous to the imperfect information regime, the second order condition is trivially





< 0 ∀i ∈ {H,L},
as marginal effort is strictly more expensive for lemons but always positive (0 > aH > aH).
As a result, pI
i,2
proofs to be a maxmimum for both types respectively.
















Similar to the other cases, high net returns and/or low marginal costs can push pI
i,2
beyond 1, and thus we set pI
i,t
:= 1 in these cases.
Step 4: Comparison to boundary points
The inferiority of boundary points follows directly from the (strict) convexity of Ui.
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Appendix C. Related Literature
C.1. Information Sharing Arrangements in Practice
Sharing information helps to mitigate problems associated with asymmetric information
and improves market efficiency. In practice, information sharing takes place via centralized
institutions that set and govern the rules of the information exchange. In credit markets - the
analytic environment we arrange this study in - information sharing arrangements are either
set up by superior institutions as public credit registries or form endogenously as private
credit bureaus. This section illustrates the features of both and highlights differences.
Public Credit Registries Private Credit Bureaus
Purpose
• Support the state’s role as a
supervisor of financial insti-
tutions
• Collect information on stand-
ing borrowers and make it
available to the actual and
potential lenders (i.e. the re-
porting financial institutions)
and regulators
• Usually no provision of value-
added services
• Focus on banking supervision
• Cater to the information
requirements of commercial
lenders
• Provide value-added services,
such as credit scores, collec-
tion services
• Collect comprehensive data
to asses and monitor the
creditworthiness of individual
clients
• Exchange of information
among banks and financial
institutions
• Theoretical substitutes: Public credit registers are set up to com-
pensate for the lack of private information sharing arrangements,
having been created mostly where no private credit bureaus ex-
isted
• Practice: Private and public credit reporting systems of coexist
and cater to different segments of the credit market
Ownership & Operation
• Public entities created by na-
tional government authori-
ties and managed by central
banks, supervision agencies,
or other regulatory authori-
ties
• Single entity per (national)
market
• Set up, owned, and managed
by commercial enterprises or
non-profit organizations
• Borrowers have the right
to inspect data and request
deletions or corrections
• Potentially competing multi-
national operations
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Public Credit Registries Private Credit Bureaus
Coverage
• Loans made by regulated fi-
nancial institutions
• All loans above the reporting
threshold must be registered
• Compulsory participation
imposed by regulation based
on rules dictated by law
• Resulting from their na-
tional regulatory origin, pub-
lic credit registries cover
only intra-national loans and
struggle with the interna-
tional integration of capital
markets
• Detailed information on
small business loans, con-
sumer credit, and trade
credit provided by financial
and non-financial lenders
• Gather and process informa-
tion on firms and individuals
from multiple sources, includ-
ing credit markets, lenders,
and suppliers
• Voluntary participation
based on the principle of
reciprocity and rules based
on contractual agreements
• In most jurisdictions data
storage is limited to a certain
amount of time (e.g. Euro-
pean Commission (2018))
Data
• Information about the type,
terms, and structure of out-
standing loans
• Personal & identifying infor-
mation
• Information about the type,
terms, and structure of indi-
vidual loans, repayment his-
tories and performance of in-
dividual standing borrowers
• Integration of hard, soft (Lib-
erti and Petersen, 2017),
black, and white informa-
tion from additional sources
such as public records, demo-
graphic databases or lawsuits
Summary
Universal coverage of loans above
a specified threshold, which mainly
consists of credit data and is dissem-
inated in consolidated form as the
total loan exposure of a borrower
Incomplete but detailed coverage of
individual loans, which is merged
with credit data and other data to
enable a comprehensive assessment
of individual borrowers
References
Pagano and Jappelli (1993); Padilla and Pagano (2000); Jappelli and
Pagano (2002); Djankov et al. (2007); World Bank (2011, 2013)
61
References
Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The Market for ”Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3), 488–500.
Allen, F. and A. M. Santomero (1997). The theory of financial intermediation. Journal of
Banking & Finance 21 (11), 1461 – 1485.
Barth, J. R., C. Lin, P. Lin, and F. M. Song (2009). Corruption in bank lending to firms:
Cross-country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing.
Journal of Financial Economics 91 (3), 361 – 388.
Beck, T., A. Demirg-Kunt, and V. Maksimovic (2004). Bank competition and access to
finance: International evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 36 (3), 627–648.
Behr, P. and S. Sonnekalb (2012). The effect of information sharing between lenders on
access to credit, cost of credit, and loan performance evidence from a credit registry
introduction. Journal of Banking & Finance 36 (11), 3017 – 3032. International Corporate
Finance Governance Conference.
Bennardo, A., M. Pagano, and S. Piccolo (2015). Multiple bank lending, creditor rights, and
information sharing. Review of Finance 19 (2), 519–570.
Bertrand, M. and A. Morse (2011). Information disclosure, cognitive biases, and payday
borrowing. The Journal of Finance 66 (6), 1865–1893.
Bester, H. (1987). The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information. Euro-
pean Economic Review 31 (4), 887 – 899. Special Issue on Market Competition, Conflict
and Collusion.
Bloomfield, R. and M. O’Hara (1999). Market transparency: Who wins and who loses? The
Review of Financial Studies 12 (1), 5–35.
Boot, A. W. (2000). Relationship banking: What do we know? Journal of Financial
Intermediation 9 (1), 7 – 25.
Boot, A. W. A. and A. V. Thakor (2000). Can relationship banking survive competition?
The Journal of Finance 55 (2), 679–713.
Bos, M., E. Breza, and A. Liberman (2018). The labor market effects of credit market
information. The Review of Financial Studies 31 (6), 2005–2037.
62
Bouckaert, J. and H. Degryse (2006). Entry and strategic information display in credit
markets. The Economic Journal 116 (513), 702–720.
Brown, M., T. Jappelli, and M. Pagano (2009). Information sharing and credit: Firm-level
evidence from transition countries. Journal of Financial Intermediation 18 (2), 151 – 172.
Brown, M. and C. Zehnder (2010). The emergence of information sharing in credit markets.
Journal of Financial Intermediation 19 (2), 255 – 278.
Buyukkarabacak, B. and N. Valev (2012). Credit information sharing and banking crises:
An empirical investigation. Journal of Macroeconomics 34 (3), 788 – 800.
Calem, P. S., M. B. Gordy, and L. J. Mester (2006). Switching costs and adverse selection
in the market for credit cards: New evidence. Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (6), 1653
– 1685. Frontiers in Payment and Settlement Systems.
Catalini, C. and J. S. Gans (2016, December). Some simple economics of the blockchain.
Working Paper 22952, National Bureau of Economic Research.
CB Insights (2017). Blockchain investment trends in review.
Dell’Ariccia, G. and R. Marquez (2004). Information and bank credit allocation. Journal of
Financial Economics 72 (1), 185 – 214.
Diamond, D. W. (1989). Reputation acquisition in debt markets. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 97 (4), 828–862.
Dierkes, M., C. Erner, T. Langer, and L. Norden (2013). Business credit information sharing
and default risk of private firms. Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (8), 2867 – 2878.
Djankov, S., C. McLiesh, and A. Shleifer (2007). Private credit in 129 countries. Journal of
Financial Economics 84 (2), 299 – 329.
Doblas-Madrid, A. and R. Minetti (2013). Sharing information in the credit market:
Contract-level evidence from u.s. firms. Journal of Financial Economics 109 (1), 198
– 223.
European Commission (2018). 2018 reform of eu data protection rules.
Eyal, I. and E. G. Sirer (2014). Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable. In
Financial Cryptography and Data Security, pp. 436–454.
63
Friedlmaier, M., A. Tumasjan, and I. M. Welpe (2018). Disrupting industries with blockchain:
The industry, venture capital funding, and regional distribution of blockchain ventures. In
Proceedings of the 51st Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS).
Gehrig, T. and R. Stenbacka (2007). Information sharing and lending market competition
with switching costs and poaching. European Economic Review 51 (1), 77 – 99.
Giannetti, M., J. M. Liberti, and J. Sturgess (2017). Information sharing and rating manip-
ulation. The Review of Financial Studies 30 (9), 3269–3304.
Glaser, F. (2017). Pervasive decentralisation of digital infrastructures: a framework for
blockchain enabled system and use case analysis. In Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii Inter-
national Conference on System Sciences.
Grajzl, P. and N. Laptieva (2016). Information sharing and the volume of private credit
in transition: Evidence from ukrainian bank-level panel data. Journal of Comparative
Economics 44 (2), 434 – 449.
Hawlitschek, F., B. Notheisen, and T. Teubner (2018). The limits of trust-free systems: A
literature review on blockchain technology and trust in the sharing economy. Electronic
Commerce Research and Applications 29, 50 – 63.
Hellmann, T. and J. Stiglitz (2000). Credit and Equity Rationing in Markets with Adverse
Selection. European Economic Review 44 (2), 281 – 304.
Hertzberg, A., J. M. Liberti, and D. Paravisini (2011). Public information and coordination:
Evidence from a credit registry expansion. The Journal of Finance 66 (2), 379–412.
Holotiuk, F., F. Pisani, and J. Moormann (2018). Unveiling the key challenges to achieve
the breakthrough of blockchain: Insights from the payments industry. In Proceedings of
the 51st Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS).
Houston, J. F., C. Lin, P. Lin, and Y. Ma (2010). Creditor rights, information sharing, and
bank risk taking. Journal of Financial Economics 96 (3), 485 – 512.
Hyytinen, A. and L. Väänänen (2006, December). Where do financial constraints originate
from? an empirical analysis of adverse selection and moral hazard in capital markets.
Small Business Economics 27 (4), 323–348.
Jappelli, T. and M. Pagano (2002). Information sharing, lending and defaults: Cross-country
evidence. Journal of Banking & Finance 26 (10), 2017 – 2045.
64
Kallberg, J. G. and G. F. Udell (2003). The value of private sector business credit information
sharing: The us case. Journal of Banking & Finance 27 (3), 449 – 469.
Karapetyan, A. and B. Stacescu (2014). Information sharing and information acquisition in
credit markets. Review of Finance 18 (4), 1583–1615.
Karlan, D. and J. Zinman (2009). Observing unobservables: Identifying information asym-
metries with a consumer credit field experiment. Econometrica 77 (6), 1993–2008.
Kirschenmann, K. (2016). Credit rationing in small firm-bank relationships. Journal of
Financial Intermediation 26, 68 – 99.
Lange, O. (1942). The foundations of welfare economics. Econometrica 10 (3/4), 215–228.
Lannquist, A. (2018). Blockchain in enterprise: How companies are using blockchain today.
Blockchain at Berkeley .
Liberti, J. M. and M. A. Petersen (2017). Information: Hard and soft. Review Corporate
Finance Studies , 1–42.
Malinova, K. and A. Park (2017). Market design with blockchain technology. SSRN .
Millon, M. H. and A. V. Thakor (1985). Moral hazard and information sharing: A model of
financial information gathering agencies. The Journal of Finance 40 (5), 1403–1422.
Nakamoto, S. (2008). Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system.
Notheisen, B., J. B. Cholewa, and A. P. Shanmugam (2017, Oct). Trading real-world assets
on blockchain. Business & Information Systems Engineering .
Notheisen, B., F. Hawlitschek, and C. Weinhardt (2017). Breaking down the blockchain
hype–towards a blockchain market engineering approach. In Proceedings of the 25th Eu-
ropean Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), pp. 1062–1080.
Padilla, A. and M. Pagano (2000). Sharing default information as a borrower discipline
device. European Economic Review 44 (10), 1951 – 1980.
Padilla, A. J. and M. Pagano (1997). Endogenous communication among lenders and en-
trepreneurial incentives. The Review of Financial Studies 10 (1), 205–236.
Pagano, M. and T. Jappelli (1993). Information sharing in credit markets. The Journal of
Finance 48 (5), 1693–1718.
65
Patel, J., R. Zeckhauser, and D. Hendricks (1991). The rationality struggle: Illustrations
from financial markets. The American Economic Review 81 (2), 232–236.
Poteshman, A. M. and V. Serbin. Clearly irrational financial market behavior: Evidence
from the early exercise of exchange traded stock options. The Journal of Finance 58 (1),
37–70.
Saleh, F. (2018). Blockchain without waste: Proof-of-stake. Working Paper .
Shapira, Z. and I. Venezia (2001). Patterns of behavior of professionally managed and
independent investors. Journal of Banking & Finance 25 (8), 1573 – 1587.
Sharma, P. (2017). Is more information always better? a case in credit markets. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization 134, 269 – 283.
Sharpe, S. A. (1990). Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit contracts: A
stylized model of customer relationships. The Journal of Finance 45 (4), 1069–1087.
Stiglitz, J. E. and A. Weiss (1981). Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.
The American Economic Review 71 (3), 393–410.
Subrahmanyam, A. (2007). Behavioural finance: A review and synthesis. European Financial
Management 14 (1), 12–29.
Vercammen, J. A. (1995). Credit bureau policy and sustainable reputation effects in credit
markets. Economica 62 (248), 461–478.
World Bank (2011). General principles for credit reporting. Financial infrastructure series -
credit reporting policy and research, World Bank.
World Bank (2013). The role of the state in financial infrastructure. Global financial devel-
opment report, World Bank.













Benedikt Notheisen and Christof Weinhard: The blockchain, plums, and 
lemons: Information asymmetries & transparency in decentralized mar-
kets, February 2019
Benedikt Notheisen, Vincenzo Marino, Daniel Englert and Christof Wein-
hard: Trading stocks on blocks: The quality of decentralized markets, 
February 2019
Francesco D‘Acunto, Daniel Hoang, Maritta Paloviita and Michael Weber: 
Human frictions in the transmission of economic policy, January 2019
Francesco D‘Acunto, Daniel Hoang, Maritta Paloviita and Michael Weber: 
IQ, expectations, and choice, January 2019
Francesco D‘Acunto, Daniel Hoang, Maritta Paloviita and Michael Weber: 
Cognitive abilities and inflation expectations, January 2019
Rebekka Buse, Melanie Schienle and Jörg Urban: Effectiveness of policy 
and regulation in European sovereign credit risk markets - A network 
analysis, January 2019
Chong Liang and Melanie Schienle: Determination of vector error correc-
tion models in high dimensions, January 2019
Rebekka Buse and Melanie Schienle: Measuring connectedness of euro 
area sovereign risk, January 2019
Carsten Bormann and Melanie Schienle: Detecting structural differences 
in tail dependence of financial time series, January 2019 
Christian Conrad and Melanie Schienle: Testing for an omitted multiplica-
tive long-term component in GARCH models, January 2019
Marta Serra-Garcia and Nora Szech: The (in)elasticity of moral ignorance, 
December 2018
recent issues
Working Paper Series in Economics
The responsibility for the contents of the working papers rests with the author, not the Institute. Since working papers 
are of a preliminary nature, it may be useful to contact the author of a particular working paper about results or ca-
veats before referring to, or quoting, a paper. Any comments on working papers should be sent directly to the author.
